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PRINCIPLES OF INVESTMENT
BUSINESS - AN ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN
PERSPECTIVE*
Paul Latimer**
I. INTRODUCTION - FIDUCIARIES
The fiduciary principle of the economic loyalty of a broker
to its client characterizes the law of stockbroker and client.
Standards of competence and skill are laid down by statutes,
cases, and industry rules. Because the securities industry oper-
ates through representatives (corporations, brokerages, and se-
curities exchanges), some jurisdictions attempt to strengthen the
vicarious liability of the principal for the actions of its agent by
confirming that the principal faces nonexcludable responsibility
for the actions of its representatives.'
This commentary considers the United Kingdom's attempt
to reduce the principles for investment business to ten "plain
English" commandments setting out the basic duties owed to
clients by those in the investment business industry from an An-
glo-Australian perspective. These commandments build on best
current practice, and are intended to be sufficiently general to
readily apply to new situations arising in the rapidly changing
* This commentary is adapted from an oral presentation given at the International
Business Law Center at Brooklyn Law School on January 22, 1991.
** Associate Professor of Law (English Nomenclature) in the Department of Ac-
counting & Finance at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. He has worked in the
private and public sectors, researched, written and taught in the area of commercial law
and securities regulation, and has published numerous securities regulation articles in
university and professional law reviews. His book AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS LAW of some
1200 pages has been published annually by CCH Australia Ltd. since 1981. Initial re-
search for this commentary was undertaken while a Visiting Scholar at Wolfson College,
University of Cambridge during Michaelmas Term 1990. The author acknowledges the
assistance provided by Anthony Boyle, Lecturer in Law, Centre for Management Stud-
ies, University of Exeter, and the helpful comments offered on the draft of this paper by
Michael Blair, General Counsel, Securities and Investments Board, Huw Llewellyn, Ex-
change Compliance Officer, London Fox - The Futures and Options Exchange, Eva
Lomnicka, Reader in Law, School of Law, King's College London, University of London,
and Paul Smee, Head of Public Policy and International Affairs Unit, International
Stock Exchange, London, but of course accepts full responsibility for this paper.
1. E.g., Corporations Act, 1989 (Commonwealth of Australia) § 82, sched. 1362
[hereinafter Australian Corporations Law], Part 7.3, Division 4 (Liability of principals
for representatives conduct); SECURITmS AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, PRINCIPLES AND CORE
RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF INVESTMENT BusImEss, Core Rule 15 (1991) [hereinafter SE-
cuRrrIEs AND INvESTMENTS BOARD, CORE RULES].
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financial sector. In the view of the writer, they provide a plain
English precedent for rules for the provision of financial services
in comparable jurisdictions such as Australia and the United
States.
The fundamental fiduciary principle of the law of principal
and agent is that of the economic loyalty owed by agent to prin-
cipal.2 The duty of the agent (hereafter, in line with British us-
age, referred to as the firm) is to act in the economic interests of
its principal (client). This principle in the United States has
been confirmed as the "Shingle Theory" under which the firm,
by the fact of putting up its shingle, impliedly represents that it
will deal fairly and competently with its customers (principals).3
Although the application of the fiduciary duty principle depends
on factors such as the nature and the expertise of the client,4 as
well as the nature of the firm's relationship with the client, the
British regulator, the Securities and Investments Board (SIB)
correctly upholds Professor Gower's dictum that "once an agent,
always a fiduciary." 5
The law of firm and client is a product of legislation,6 case
law,7 and rules,8 but nowhere is there one clear statement that
can be readily communicated to those in the industry.9 The
2. See Paul Latimer, Disclosure and Fair Dealing by Stockbrokers, 18 ANGLo-AM.
L. REV. 335 (1989).
3. E.g., R. JENNINGS AND H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION - CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 625-26 (6th ed. 1987).
4. An investor (such as an execution only client) not relying on the firm's skill, care
and diligence who treats the firm as a counterparty is arguably not owed the level of
fiduciary duty owed to a client dependent on the firm. But the relationship will still have
fiduciary aspects relating to monies and securities held by the broker. Option Invest-
ments (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Martin, A.S.L.R. para. 76-004 (CCH) (1981).
5. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT BUSINESS -
THE NEW FRAMEWORK 26 (1985).
6. E.g., in the United Kingdom: Financial Services Act, 1986, (U.K.) [hereinafter
Financial Services Act]; Companies Act, 1985, (U.K.) [hereinafter Companies Act]; Com-
pany Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, (U.K.); Fair Trading Act, 1973 (U.K.). In the
United States: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1991); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1991) [hereinafter Securities Exchange Act]; Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1991). In Australia: Australian Corporations Law, supra
note 1, at § 82; Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Austl.) [hereinafter Trade Practices Act].
7. Agency cases are legion. For example, Christopher Barker & Sons v. Commission-
ers of Inland Revenue, [1919] 2 K.B. 222, 228; Option Investments (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v.
Martin, A.S.L.R. para. 76-004 (1981).
8. The business and the listing rules of the exchanges. E.g., Paul Latimer, Stock
Exchange Usage, 8 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 165 (1990) [hereinafter Latimer, Stock
Exchange].
9. "No one can serve two masters." Matthew 6 : 24, which the United States Su-
preme Court has observed, "is especially pertinent if one of the masters happens to be
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British concept of ten easily stated and easily remembered
"Commandments" is to be commended as a precedent to be fol-
lowed by equivalent jurisdictions.
II. REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION OF THE BRITISH SECURI-
TIES INDUSTRY
Following deregulation of the British financial sector in the
1980's, regulation of the securities markets is now vested in the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry acting through the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Under section 114 of
the Financial Services Act of 1986 (the Act), the Secretary of
State can transfer functions to "a designated agency."'10 The des-
ignated agency has the capacity to issue statements of principle,
rules, regulations, and codes of practice, and has the power to
promote and maintain standards" and a satisfactory system to
monitor and enforce the obligations for which it is responsible. 2
The agency can also investigate complaints brought to its atten-
tion.'3 To date the first and only "designated agency" is the
SIB,'4 a private body at law funded by the industry. 5
By transfer from the DTI under section 114, the SIB has
received extensive powers to monitor and enforce investment ac-
tivity. It has the power of a DTI inspector over authorized busi-
ness,'6 the power to prosecute certain cases,' 7 the power to be
judge and jury in publishing a statement as to a person's mis-
conduct in violating various sections of the Act.'8 The SIB also
has the power to apply for injunctions and restitution (disgorge-
ment) orders on behalf of investors. 19 Furthermore, the SIB is
economic self-interest." United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520,
549 (1961), cited by L. Loss, FuNDAMENTALs OF SEcuRrms REGULATION 963 (1983).
10. If the Secretary of State is fulfilling the requirements of Financial Services Act,
supra note 6, at sched. 7 (Qualifications of Designated Agency) and the competition re-
quirements in §§ 121-23.
11. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at sched. 7, paras. 2, 5.
12. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at sched. 7, para. 3.
13. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at sched. 7, para. 4.
14. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 114(2).
15. A company limited by guarantee.
16. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at §§ 104-06.
17. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 201.
18. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 60, subject to the safeguards in § 60(2)
(written notice), § 60(4) (notice to include reference to Financial Services Tribunal), and§ 97(1) (requirement that Secretary of State make a reference to the Tribunal).
19. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 61.
1991]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
immune from civil lawsuits.20
The most important role of the SIB in the British system is
its power to authorize investment business directly.21 Without
authorization, it is an offense to carry on investment business.22
Investment businesses may also obtain authorization through
membership in self-regulating organizations (SROs) 23 and recog-
nized professional bodies (RPBs), which have been recognized
by the SIB as meeting certain standards laid down in the Act.
There are currently four SROs. 24 Once recognized, the SRO
"regulates the carrying on of [the] investment business [of its
members] of any kind by enforcing rules which are binding on
persons carrying on business of that kind. ' 25 Obtaining authori-
zation as an SRO therefore entails acceptance of a regulatory
framework at least as demanding as that covering persons di-
rectly authorized by the SIB.
Section 48 of the Act authorizes the SIB to make rules regu-
lating the conduct of investment business by authorized persons,
and as set out in section 48(2), these rules deal with the prohibi-
tion of persons carrying on business, the content of advertise-
ments, disclosure of commissions, mandated disclosure, the set-
tlement of disputes, and accounting requirements. In November
1988, as part of its "New Settlement ' 26 in the regulation of fi-
nancial services, the SIB,. in conjunction with the SROs and the
RPBs, released a paper entitled "Conduct of Business Rules: A
New Approach. '2 7 The SIB's new approach was welcomed by
the DTI2s and was followed in March 1989 with another SIB pa-
20. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 187.
21. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at §§ 25-30.
22. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at §§ 15-21.
23. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at §§ 7-14.
24. The four self-regulating organizations (SROs) are: (1) The Securities and Fu-
tures Authority (SFA) (resulting from the merger of the Association of Futures Brokers
and Dealers (AFBD) and The Securities Association (TSA)); (2) the Financial In-
termediaries Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA); (3) the Invest-
ment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO); and (4) the.Life Assurance and the
Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO).
25. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 8(1).
26. This is the term used by the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) itself, e.g.,
Eva Lomnicka, The "New Settlement" in the Regulation of Financial Services, 1990
BRIT. Bus. L. 254.
27. Noted in FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORTER (CCH) para. 96-116 (1988) [hereinafter
1988 REPORTER].
28. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, CONSULTATIVE PAPER, POSSIBLE CHANGES
TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986, noted in BARRY RIDER, CHARLES ABRAMS, EILIS
FERRAN, GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVIcES ACT 1986, para. 602 (1989).
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per, "A Wider Role for SIB's Principles of Conduct: the next
stage of the new approach."29 Three tiers are planned under this
"New Settlement," and the principles of conduct in force from
April 1990 together with the second tier, the Securities and In-
vestments Board Core Rules (released early 1991) (hereafter the
"Core Rules") are designed to form the essential "spine" of the
United Kingdom regulatory system. These rules are to be sup-
plemented by the third tier rules, and guidance is to be prepared
by the appropriate SRO under the supervision of the SIB.
The principles of conduct are a plain English"° restatement
of centuries of statutory, common law, and equitable case law
principles expressed in a user-friendly style, and are designed to
move away from the more traditional, cumbersome and legalistic
tone of broker/client law.3 1 They apply to all persons authorized
directly by the SIB,32 by the SROs, and by the RPBs. The prin-
ciples also apply to the marketing activities and pension fund
management of insurance companies and friendly societies.
However, the enforcement and monitoring of these principles of
conduct is a matter of self-regulation by the industry through
the SROs and the RPBs3 3 In the words of the SIB, the object of
its review of the existing rulebook is to make the SIB rules
clearer and to "enhance their effectiveness, and also to present
them in a more coherent and logical structure, 3 4 rather than to
change their substance. Individual SROs are not free to adapt
this common core and are responsible for monitoring and enforc-
ing the principles as they apply to those they regulate.3 5 To be
29. See generally FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORTER (CCH) para. 96-161 (1989) [herein-
after 1989 REPORTER].
30. Statutes, cases, legal documents, and official documents can use clarity of ex-
pression without affecting their accuracy. E.g., Current Topics, "Legalese" and "Court-
speak", 59 AusTRALAN L.J. 189 (1985); LAw REFORM COMISSION OF VICTORIA, PLAIN
ENGLISH AND THE LAW (1987), cited in 62 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 496 (1988).
31. Known colloquially as the "Ten Commandments," these principles are made
under the Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 47A; in relation to friendly societies,
they are made under sched. 11, para. 13A (1990).
32. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at §§ 25-30.
33. SIB regulation is applicable only to those directly authorized by it.
34. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, CONDucT OF BUSINESS RULES: A NEW AP-
PROACH (1988), quoted in 1988 REPORTER, supra note 27, at para. 96-116.
35. Proposed §§ 47B of Financial Services Act, supra note 6, which would have al-
lowed for modification or waiver of statements of principle in particular cases, received a
negative response because of the risk of undermining the principles and is unlikely to be
proclaimed. See SEcusrEs AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR IN-
VESTMENT BUSINESS, Principle 6, noted in FINANcIAL SERVICES REPORTER (CCH) Para. 96-
230 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 REPORTER].
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entrusted with this power of regulation, an SRO/RPB must ful-
fill the recognition requirements set out in the Act. These re-
quirements include membership qualifications, safeguards for in-
vestors, taking account of costs of compliance, monitoring and
enforcement capacity, investigation of complaints, and promo-
tion and maintenance of high standards of integrity and fair
dealing in the carrying on of investment business.36
Self-regulation by SROs and RPBs builds on the standards,
traditions, expectations, and of course the self-interest of the
centuries-old self-regulation of the investment industry. It vests
authority in, and places responsibility on, the self-regulators, as
well as the not so insignificant costs of self-regulation.37 The Act
seeks to ensure that the self-regulators rigorously require their
members to maintain the highest ethical standards. The system
works best in the form of "co-regulation" by government and
self-regulator, as in the United States, Canada, Britain, and
Australia. 38 Although the government in such a system autho-
rizes stock exchanges and provides the legislative framework and
licensing standards, the daily administration is in the hands of
the exchange, SRO or RPB, subject to the overriding power of
government to intervene. Because SRO/RPB rules have contrac-
tual authority, the self-regulators have in effect captured the
law-making process.3 9 The rules as "instruments" are passed in-
dependently, and unlike statutory instruments, they do not have
the benefit or burden of scrutiny and approval by parliament. 0
Self-regulation has many reported benefits such as industry
36. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 10, sched. 2, and § 18, sched. 3.
37. Critics define self-regulation as "pay for it yourself."
38. Australia's regulator is the Australian Securities Commission (ASC), a federal
government Commission established under the Australian Securities Commission Act,
1989, (Austl.). It administers federal law called the Corporations Law, a schedule of the
Corporations Act 1989 (Austl.), see supra note 1. As in the United Kingdom, the ASC is
the lead regulator of industry-based SROs. The ASC took over on January 1, 1991, from
the previous state-based National Companies and Securities Commission which success-
fully led Australia's then State and Territory based "co-operative scheme for companies
and securities," which existed from 1982 to 1990.
39. The SIB rule book is made under statutory authority to legislate conferred by
the Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at §§ 48-49, 51-55, 107 and transferred to it
thereunder by the Department of Trade and Industry. In contrast, the SRO and Recog-
nized Professional Bodies (RPB) rule books are not made under any statutory power.
Instead, they are enforceable by reason of the contract that exists between the SRO/
RPB and its members/certified persons. The only "statutory" link, noted in the text
accompanying note 43, is that the rule book has to be judged by the SIB as "adequate."
40. The rules are technically not statutory instruments. The Financial Services Act,
supra note 6, at sched. 9, para. 5, operating in lieu of § 205 and § 205A.
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expertise and flexibility of response. It can be cost-effective if
paid for by the industry and administered by high caliber and
high income private sector staffing. Whereas government can
only regulate by prescription, industry can self-regulate by en-
forcement of legal sanctions as well as by upholding the indus-
try's ethical standards."' However, self-regulation can fail if it is
not externally monitored. In a 1965 report by a Canadian Royal
Commission, the then self-regulation on the Toronto Stock Ex-
change (prior to the introduction of external supervision of the
Exchange) was found to display the following three weaknesses:
(1) the rulemaking did not keep pace with loopholing deficien-
cies in the rules; (2) there was widespread aberration from strict
observance of the spirit of the rules; and (3) there was "woeful
lack of any effective surveillance to ensure the adherence to
rule. '42 Self-regulation can also add to government regulation
and costly and inefficient duplication of efforts.
Until 1990, SRO and RPB rule books had to follow that of
the SIB by passing the equivalence test. Under the equivalence
test the SROs/RPBs had to match the SIB's parent rule book.
Absent actual statutory power, the SIB could therefore still indi-
rectly regulate the conduct of the members of SROs/RPBs by
setting the standards to be followed. In 1990, this equivalence
test was replaced with a test of adequacy: rules and statements
of principle of an SRO/RPB must "afford an adequate level of
protection for investors. '43 The new test allows room for overall
judgment instead of a legalistic comparison of rules, and it dif-
fers from the old equivalence test in three important ways: (1)
the removal of the old statutory requirement to balance investor
protection offered by the SRO/RPB rulebook with that of the
SIB; (2) consideration of the rule books as well as statements of
principle, and any other statutory rules or codes of conduct; and
(3) consideration of other factors beyond the rulebook itself,
such as effectiveness of enforcement and other controls.44
41. Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Industry Self-Regulation - Tested by the
Crash, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1297, 1304-1313 (1988).
42. ONTARIO ROYAL COMMISSION, THE WINDFALL REPORT 100 (1965), cited in Paul
Latimer, Regulation of Securities Industry Intermediaries - Australian Proposals, 9
U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 1, 13 (1987); Alan C. Page, Self-regulation: The Constitutional
Dimension, 49 MOD. L. REv. 141 (1986).
43. Companies Act, supra note 6, at § 203(1) substituted paras. 3(1), (2) to Financial
Services Act, supra note 6, at sched. 2 for SROs. Companies Act, supra note 6, at §
203(2) substituted para. 3 to sched. 3 for RPBs.
44. SECURIrIEs AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND INVEST-
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As confirmed by many commentators, the deregulation of
the British securities markets in the 1980's was a reaction to the
external forces of the internationalization of capital markets and
the deregulation of other major financial markets through the
1980's. 45 The thin or nonexistent rule books have given way to
the new principles set out in the three tiers of regulation.
III. THE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT
The principles of conduct are intended to indicate stan-
dards of conduct, such as standards in assessing negligence.4
The principles are not actionable by an investor under section
62 of the Act because they are not in the classes specified, and
because of their specific exclusion by section 47A(3).47 Had they
given rise to actions for damages, they would no doubt have
been differently drafted.48 However, breach of a principle is also
likely to be a breach of the SIB or SRO/RPB rule book which is
clearly actionable under section 62, although only by a "private
investor. '49 In addition, SROs can discipline their members for
breaches of the principles, with the ultimate sanctions being sus-
pension or removal of authorization.
Private action is one of the successes of the United States
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). Courts in
the United States have recognized a private right of action
under section 10(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5,
promulgated thereunder, since the 1940s. Rule 10b-5 basically
proscribes misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent conduct, and has
given rise to a vast jurisprudence in Securities and Exchange
Commission and private proceedings in a wide range of financial
services litigation. In similar plain English, Australia's compara-
mENTs BOARD FOR 1989/90 33 (1990).
45. E.g., MCHAEL MORAN, THE POLITICS OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION
(1990).
46. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR INVESTMENT
BUSINESS, Principle 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 REPORTER, supra note 35 at, para. 96-230.
47. Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at §§ 47A(3), 62.
48. SIB favored the principles which are now the core rules to be available for the
purpose of civil claims under Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 62. They would
have had the status of a statutory tort, enforceable by investor against firm. 1989 RE-
PORTER, supra note 29, at para. 96-161.
49. As defined in the Financial Services Act, (Restriction of Right of Action) Regu-
lations 1991 (No. 489 of 1991), d.2, a "private investor" means an investor "otherwise
than in the course of carrying on investment business" (in the case of an individual), and
an investor "otherwise than in the course of carrying on business of any kind" (in the
case of "any other person," including a company).
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ble section 52 of its Trade Practices Act of 1974 (the Trade
Practices Act) sweepingly proscribes engaging in conduct "that
is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive."
Originally intended as a consumer protection section especially
targeting advertisers, there now appears to be no limit to the
inventiveness of section 52 litigation as it spreads from advertis-
ing to misrepresentation, breach of contract, passing off, defa-
mation, negligence, corporate law, and the securities industry. 0
Section 52 gives standing to sue to any person misled or
deceived. The success of section 52 as a catch-all has led to the
adoption of equivalent words as section 995 of the Australian
Corporations Law as from January 1, 1991. Further, an injunc-
tion to restrain conduct which is misleading or deceptive may be
granted under section 80 of the Trade Practices Act on the ap-
plication of the Attorney-General, the Australian Trade Prac-
tices Commission, or "any other person" to prevent threatened
as well as actual misleading or deceptive conduct.51 In addition
to this, Australian securities law specifically contains an impor-
tant private enforcement section in Corporations Law section
777.52 This section empowers the court to order compliance with,
or enforcement of, the business or listing rules of the exchange
on the application of the Australian Securities Commission, the
securities exchange, or an aggrieved person.53 Since the prede-
cessor of this section was enacted in 1976, the exchange has
never sought to enforce this section, fearing a court order of
costs against it if unsuccessful. Court decisions have attempted
to narrow the definition of an aggrieved person to a person with
a genuine grievance so that not just any shareholder would have
standing.54 The better view, expressed in relation to a parallel
section, takes the expansive approach that standing is available
to any person whose interests have been affected.5
50. E.g., Philip H. Clarke, Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Relation to Take-
overs, 7 COMPANY & SEc. L.J. 108 (1989); PAUL LATIMER, AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS LAW 447-
57 (1990).
51. See infra note 55.
52. Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, contains a parallel enforcement pro-
vision at § 1140 for private action against futures exchanges, clearing houses, or futures
associations.
53. Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at § 777.
54. Robox Nominees Pty. Ltd. v. Bell Resources Ltd., 4 A.C.L.C. 164 (1986).
55. The Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Bell Resources Ltd., 2 A.C.L.C. 157
(1984). In relation to the forerunner of Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at §
1324, Broken Hill overrides earlier restrictive interpretations on this standing require-
ment. Wide standing given in the equivalent "any other person" in Trade Practices Act,
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As discussed in Part II, the SIB "New Settlement" has re-
sulted in a clearly stated and universal set of principles of con-
duct stating the duty owed by securities firms to clients. They
are designed to encapsulate, express, and build on current best
practice, and to be readily understood not only by financial ex-
perts, but by all those in the financial markets. The principles
are intended to be sufficiently general to be readily applied to all
new situations' without the need for frequent amendment and
updating that has characterized the rule books to date.56 The
principles open with a preamble and objects clause encapsu-
lating their purpose and objects, and, most importantly, state in
Introduction 2 that they are not exhaustive of the standards ex-
pected. Common law and equitable principles (such as the law of
fiduciaries) are therefore preserved.5 7 Under statutory interpre-
tation principles, the preamble may be referred to as an aid to
interpretation so long as it does not contradict clear and unam-
biguous language in the statute (or in this case, the principles of
conduct):
Statements of Principle
Introduction
(1)These principles are intended to form a universal statement
of the standards expected. They apply directly to the conduct
of investment business and financial standing of all authorized
persons ("firms"), including members of recognized self-regu-
lating organizations and firms certified by recognized profes-
sional bodies.
(2)The principles are not exhaustive of the standards expected.
Conformity with the principles does not absolve a failure to
observe other requirements, while the observance of other re-
quirements does not necessarily amount to conformity with the
principles.
(3)The principles do not give rise to actions for damages, but
will be available for purposes of discipline and intervention.
(4)Where the principles refer to customers, they should be
taken to refer also to clients and to potential customers, and
supra note 6, at § 80, has led to many public interest cases. See, e.g., Phelps v. Western
Mining Corporation Ltd., 33 F.L.R. 327, A.T.P.R. 40-077 (1978) (misleading mining ad-
vertisements); Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc. v. Tobacco Insti-
tute of Australia Ltd., 100 A.L.R. 568, A.T.P.R. 40-916 (1988), A.T.P.R. 41-079 (1991)
(misleading tobacco advertising).
56. ScURrrIIs AND INVESTMETrs BOARD, THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR INVESTMENT
BUsINESS, CONSULTATIVE PAPER No. 33, 7 (1990).
57. See id. at Principle 6.
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where they refer to a firm's regulator, they mean SIB, or a self-
regulating organization or professional body which regulates
the firm.
(5)Although the principles may be taken as expressing existing
standards, they come into force formally, with additional sanc-
tions resulting, on 30 April 1990.
After this introduction, the principles then continue as follows:
The Principles
(1)Integrity
A firm should observe high standards of integrity and fair
dealing.
The wholeness or honesty encompassed by the word "integ-
rity" is manifest in the high standard expected by Principle 1.
Although legal definitions are not required to explain "integrity
and fair dealing," the words incorporate the high ethical conduct
expected of the securities industry, which are characterized by
words such as "fidelity," "integrity," "trust," and "honour."5 In
the words of Australian case law,
[t]he occupation of sharebroking demands high standards of
integrity. In carrying on his occupation a sharebroker acts, not
for himself, but for his client. His remuneration is his broker-
age, or commission. Clients, some with great, others with little,
business acumen and ability to protect themselves, seek and
act on his advice and permit him to handle their money and
their shares. Those clients are entitled to expect from a broker
not only competence, but also integrity and absence of conflict-
ing personal interests. His position is one of trust and responsi-
bility. By the recognition and pursuit of the high traditions of
their occupation, brokers have aspired to the status of an
honourable profession. The price they must pay for this status
is that they forswear all compromise of their integrity, and that
they repudiate the creation of personal interests which could
bring them into conflict with their duty to their clients. 59
Certainly the term encompasses the avoiding of conflicts of
interest as required in equity, as later set out in Principle 6.
(2) Skill, Care and Diligence
A firm should act with due skill, care and diligence.
58. In line with the motto of London's International Stock Exchange, "My word is
my bond."
59. Bonds & Securities (Trading) Pty. Ltd. v. Glomex Mines N.L., 1 N.S.W.L.R.
879, 891 (1971).
1991]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
The need for proper skill, care, and diligence in the carrying
out of duties permeates all business. The concepts mean that
those holding themselves out as being qualified to give invest-
ment advice, and who stand to profit when their advice is fol-
lowed, are held to a duty of care commensurate with their re-
sponsibilities.60 This principle obviously overlaps with Principle
4's "know your client" rule, discussed below. Diligence imports
the concept of industriousness and attentiveness to duties. In
theory, the applicable standard is that which a reasonable per-
son would expect of an ordinarily competent and alert firm in
the circumstances, but in practice the courts expect a high stan-
dard of skill, care, and diligence in specialized areas like profes-
sional practice. Tort law confirms over and over again the duty
of care expected of the professional adviser for negligent
misstatements.61
(3) Market Practice
A firm should observe high standards of market conduct. It
should also, to the extent endorsed for the purpose of this prin-
ciple, comply with any code or standard as in force from time
to time and as it applies to the firm either according to its
terms or by rulings made under it.
Principle 3 deals with codes not covered by the Financial
Services Act. It went through a number of public drafts, and was
originally headed "Observance of Standards," specifying for a
firm compliance with outlying standards, for example:
applicable provisions of any code or set of standards published
by its regulator, by the Bank of England or the Takeover
Panel, or by any authority recognized by law in the United
Kingdom (or, where the firm carries on activities affecting any
other country, in that country) as responsible in the public in-
terest for the supervision or regulation of financial activities.62
These other codes include the Takeover Code administered
by the Takeover Panel and The Grey Book Market Code
60. See, e.g., Meddick and Meddick v. Cutten and Harvey, 36 S.A.St.R. 542, 556
(1984); DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KING-
DOM - A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION 20 (1985) [hereinafter DEPART-
MENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL SERVICES].
61. In Anglo-Australian law, starting with Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller and
Partners Ltd., [1964] App. Cas. 465.
62. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, REGULATION OF THE CONDUCT OF INVEST-
MENT BUSINESS: A PROPOSAL (1989), reproduced in 1989 REPORTER, supra note 29, at para.
96-196.
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(wholesale markets in Sterling, Foreign Exchange, and Bullion)
administered by the Bank of England. Principle 3 then re-
stricted this expectation under the new heading "Best market
practice" to cover only standards of market conduct and codes
or standards issued or approved by the relevant regulator.6 3 It
was expected that FIMBRA, IMRO and TSA would approve the
Takeover Code for this purpose, that AFBD, IMRA and TSA
would endorse the Bank of England Grey Book, and that AFBD
would endorse the Oil Markets Code.6 4 In fact, free standing en-
dorsement by SROs has now been abandoned, but SIB still
plans to endorse codes for the purposes of Principle 3. The third
and final draft of Principle 3, now headed "Market practice,"
requires the observance of "high standards of market conduct."
It also requires compliance with any code or standards "to the
extent endorsed for the purpose of this principle. ' 65 But in re-
quiring observance of high standards of market conduct, no
mention is made of traditional fiduciary duties or to the com-
mon law duties owed by an agent to its principal. Presumably
these are encapsulated in Principles 1 and 6. "Market conduct"
goes wider than regulatory rules, and covers at least the SIB
rules, the rules of the SROs and the RPBs, and the rules and
practices of the International Stock Exchange and other Futures
and Commodities.
This compliance requirement would have had the desirable
effect of enabling the SIB to enforce the Takeover Code at its
own instance. Indeed, such power should exist, as it does under
equivalent legislation in Australia.6 To counter this possibility,
the SIB issued an instrument, Codes or Standards: SIB's en-
dorsement under Principle 3,67 which restricts the SIB's power
to enforce the Takeover Code to situations at the request of the
Panel, thereby preserving the Panel as sole arbiter on the Take-
over Code. The instrument also restricts SIB's powers to seek
injunctive relief, or to prevent parties to takeover bids from
seeking SIB intervention, with the result that bid disputes
63. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR INVESTMENT
Busi uss (1990), reproduced in 1990 REPORTER, supra note 35, at para. 96-230.
64. See supra note 24.
65. Issued by SIB on March 15, 1990 (in force from April 30, 1990) under authority
of Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 47A, reproduced in 1990 REPORTER, supra
note 35, at para. 96-256.
66. See supra notes 52 and 55.
67. Issued by SIB in 1990.
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would be increasingly decided by the courts rather than by the
Panel. In any event, section 47A of the Act deals with the inter-
action of Financial Services Act regulators enforcing the Princi-
ples, with the enforcement of other codes by other regulators.
Section 47A(5) enables enforcement by regulators which are not
covered by the Financial Services Act regulator. Proposed sec-
tion 47B (not yet in force, and unlikely to ever be proclaimed
due to its widespread criticism) further deals with the interac-
tion of the principles with the SRO and RPB rule books in al-
lowing modification or waiver of statements of principle in par-
ticular cases.68
(4) Information about Customers
A firm should seek from customers it advises or from whom it
exercises discretion any information about their circumstances
and investment objectives which might reasonably be expected
to be relevant in enabling it to fulfill its responsibilities to
them.
In accordance with Principle 4, investment firms should
take account of the expertise, needs, and resources of their cus-
tomers before recommending particular transactions. This re-
states the "know your client" rule found in international securi-
ties laws, whereby an adviser is to have a reasonable basis for
believing that recommendations are suitable for the require-
ments of its customer. To fulfill this duty, an adviser must have
considered and investigated the subject matter of the recom-
mendation as is reasonable in the circumstances to determine
that it is appropriate in view of the investment objectives, finan-
cial situation, and the particular needs of the customer. Austra-
lia's "know your client" rule is contained in the Corporations
Law .6  Breach of the Australian rule gives rise to a claim for
damages for any loss suffered.
(5) Information for Customers
A firm should take reasonable steps to give a customer it ad-
vises, in a comprehensible and timely way, any information
needed to enable him [sic] to make a balanced and informed
decision. A firm should similarly be ready to provide a cus-
tomer with a full and fair account of the fullfillment [sic] of its
68. Contained in Companies Act, supra note 6, at § 192; supra note 35.
69. E.g., SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES (CONDUCT OF
BusINEss) RULES, rule 5.01(1) [hereinafter SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, CONDUCT
OF BUSINESS]; Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at § 851.
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responsibilities to him.
Customers need information for investment decisions in line
with the aphorism that a "securities market is a market for in-
formation." Principle 5 requires a firm to keep a customer in-
formed, and places the firm under a statutory duty of disclosure.
This is over and above the disclosure requirements of a fiduciary
in equity law. Information to be disclosed includes such matters
as: (1) any material interest which a firm might have in a pro-
posed transaction; (2) the capacity in which it would act (princi-
pal, agent, jobber, market maker); (3) fees, benefits and commis-
sions;70 (4) remuneration it may receive from other parties
interested in the transaction; and (5) any other factors poten-
tially affecting its independence. 7 1 A firm with a "material inter-
est" in a transaction must not act unless it has "take[n] reasona-
ble steps to ensure fair treatment for the customer. '7 2
Securities laws target advertising. The Financial Services
Act of 1986 (United Kingdom) requires "investment advertise-
ments"7 3 and Conduct of Business Rules to be issued and ap-
proved by an "authorised person." Misleading statements and
practices are proscribed under international securities regulation
laws to restrain false information from the market. 4
(6) Conflicts of Interest
A firm should either avoid any conflict of interest arising or,
where conflicts arise, should ensure fair treatment to all its
customers by disclosure, internal rules of confidentiality, de-
clining to act, or otherwise. A firm should not unfairly place its
interests above those of its customers and, where a properly
informed customer would reasonably expect that the firm
would place his [sic] interests above its own, the firm should
live up to that expectation.
70. E.g., Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at § 849, places a statutory
obligation on a "securities adviser" making a "securities recommendation" to disclose
particulars of "any commission or fee, or any other benefit or advantage, whether pecuni-
ary or not and whether direct or indirect," elaborated in NATIONAL COMANmS AND SE-
cuRrrIEs COMMISSION, PRACTIc E NOTE No. 319 (1990).
71. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 60, at 20.
72. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, CORE RULES, supra note 1, at Core Rule 2.
73. As defined in Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 57(2), and subject to
exemptions set out in § 58 such as issues by government and local government, issues by
any central bank (including the Bank of England and Australia's Reserve Bank), and
various exempt issues (by investment exchanges, clearing houses, Lloyd's, listed money
market institutions, and others).
74. E.g., "Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 47; Securities Exchange Act,
supra note 6, at Rule 10b-5; Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at § 995.
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The duty of economic loyalty encompassed by the avoidance
of conflicts of interest is set out in Principle 6. Conflicts of inter-
est are to be avoided, and the firms's private interests are not to
conflict with the interests of the customer. In fact, Principle 6
offers a firm a choice between what can be described as a high
road (to avoid any conflict), and a low road (if there is a conflict,
to ensure fair treatment). But in making this choice, a firm must
comply with Core Rules 2 and 36. Core Rule 2 requires a firm
which has a material interest in a transaction "to ensure fair
treatment for the customer." Core Rule 36 builds on section
48(2)(h) of the Act to isolate information behind "Chinese
Walls" in appropriate circumstances. 75
Disclosure of information is one of the overriding principles
of laws regulating the securities industry. At common law, an
agent is under a duty of full disclosure of all matters likely to
influence the conduct of the principal, and in particular, an
agent cannot enter any transaction where its personal interest
may conflict with the legal duties owed to the principal, unless
the principal has given full consent upon disclosure of all mate-
rial circumstances.76 Securities laws require securities firms to
give priority to clients' orders. A firm is not to compete with a
client in a securities transaction unless the client's instructions
cannot be fulfilled, for instance instructions on price."7
The SIB principles conform to agency principles. As noted
under Principle 5, rule 5.08 requires disclosure by a firm recom-
mending a transaction of any material interest'it may have in
the transaction.7" The firm's independence must be maintained,
and associations with particular institutions must be disclosed.79
Hence, overriders and other inducements are prohibited as they
influence the adviser's judgment and introduce conflict of inter-
75. E.g., Norman S. Poser, Chinese Walls or Emperor's New Clothes? Regulating
Conflicts of Interests of Securities Firms in the U.S. and the U.K., 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 91 (1988). Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 48(6) provides that
compliance with the Chinese Wall provisions avoids the risk of misleading statements
and practices in breach of § 47.
76. A principle of long standing, see, e.g., Burton v. Wookey, 6 Madd. 367, 56 E.R.
1131 (1822); Rothschild v. Brookman, 2 Dow. & Cl. 188, 6 E.R. 699 (1831); Fullwood v.
Hurley, 1 K.B. 498 (1928); F.M.B. REYNOLDS, BowsTEAD ON AGENCY 164 (1985).
77. E.g., Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at § 844.
78. SECURITIES AND INVEsTMENT BoARD, CoRE RULES, supra note 1, at Core Rule 2;
SECURITmS AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, CONDUCT OF BUSINESS, supra note 69, at rule 5.08.
79. SEcuRrrms AND INVEsTMENT BOARD, CORE RULES, supra note 1, at Core Rule 2;
SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, CONDUCT OF BusINEss, supra note 69, at rule 5.08.
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est.s0 The Australian Corporations Law requires disclosure of
commissions or fees received."' Principal trading by the firm
raises the potential for conflict unless disclosed and consented
to. Securities laws, for example, prevent a securities dealer deal-
ing in any securities with a person who is not a dealer (the cli-
ent) unless first informing that person that the dealer is acting
in the transaction as principal and not as agent.82 In fact, two
disclosures to the client are required: (1) at the commencement
of the contract of dealing; and (2) ex post facto in the contract
note provided as evidence of the transaction.
Arguably, Principle 6 sets out a lower standard than that
imposed on an agent by the common law. Case law states clearly
that "[n]o man can in this court, acting as an agent, be allowed
to put himself into a position in which his interest and duty will
be in conflict. ' '8 3 Compliance with the principles may still result
in conflict of interest at common law. Therefore, this raises the
issue of conflict arising when statutory rules and nonstatutory
law (common law or equitable principles such as those on fiduci-
aries) apply to the same activity. The rules of statutory interpre-
tation state that unless there is a specific provision to the con-
trary, the pre-existing law continues with only the changes
necessary to give effect to the statute.8 4 Indeed, at the time of
writing, the issue of the relationship between regulatory rules
and fiduciary duties is before the English Law Commission and
the Scottish Law Commission. 5 Two views have surfaced: (1)
regulatory rules cannot alter the strict obligations of the com-
mon law unless expressly enabled by some statutory power; and
(2) in defining the duties of a participant in the financial ser-
vices market, the courts should take account of the regulatory
regime to define the extent of the rights and remedies of clients
80. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT BOARD, CORE RULES, supra note 1, at Core Rule 1;
SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, CONDUCT OF BUSINESS, supra note 69, at rule 2.04.
81. Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at §§ 849.
82. E.g., Securities Exchange Act, supra note 6, at rule 10b-10a; Australian Corpora-
tions Law, supra note 1, at § 843.
83. THE LAW SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND, INVESTOR PROTECTION COMMITTEE, RESPONSE TO
THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION ANENT FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
ACT 7 (1990) [hereinafter THE LAW SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND].
84. E.g., D.C. PEARCE & R.S. GEDDES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN AUSTRALIA 104
(1988).
85. LAw COMMISSION, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND REGULATORY RULES, ISSUES QUESTION-
NAME (1990); THE LAW SOCIETY, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND REGULATORY RULES, RESPONSE TO
THE LAW COMMISSION'S ISSUES QUESTIONNAIRE (1991); THE LAW SoCIETY OF SCOTLAND,
supra note 83.
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rather than common law and equitable duties which exceed or
are incompatible with those of the regulatory regime. In line
with the British compromise, the current view has to lie between
these two extremes. There is no reason in principle why statu-
tory and nonstatutory regulatory rules should not be allowed to
modify pre-existing fiduciary duties. Common law obligations
are modified by nonstatutory regulatory rules, such as contracts
on the stock exchange made "subject to" the exchange's own
rules.86 Conformity with the established standard can assist in
rebutting an allegation of negligence.87
(7) Customer Assets
Where a firm has control of or is otherwise responsible for as-
sets belonging to a customer which it is required to safeguard,
it should arrange proper protection for them, by way of segre-
gation and identification of those assets or otherwise, in accor-
dance with the responsibility it has accepted.
Agency law has always imposed on an agent duties to the
principal regarding the identification and the preservation of the
assets of the principal. There is a clearly recognized duty to keep
accounts and to segregate the principal's funds to enable identi-
fication of the customer's property," and to account to the prin-
cipal. 9 Clients' money must be paid into a trust account, and
firms' accounts must be audited and lodged with the firm's regu-
lator. For the protection of the clients' funds, Principle 7 man-
dates their segregation for safeguarding while under the control
of a securities firm on the basis that the possibility of fraud is
reduced and loss through insolvency of the firm is curtailed as
the clients' funds could not be used to pay the general debts of
the broker.90 A client's documents of title are also to be safe-
guarded. 1 Registrable instruments are to be registered in the
86. Latimer, Stock Exchange, supra note 8, at 166.
87. Although Australian law states that the standard of care is not the English sub-
jective test of what is done in the circumstances, Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management
Committee, 2 All E.R. 118 (1957), but is instead the objective test of what ought to be
done, F. v. R., 33 S.A.St.R. 189 (1983).
88. E.g., SIB's rules made under the Financial Services Act, supra note 6, at § 49;
THE SEcuRiEs ASSOCIATION, FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 100 (1987) [hereinafter THE SE-
cunrrms ASSOCIATION]; Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at Parts 7.5, 7.6.
89. Lupton v. White 15 Ves. Jun. 432, 33 E.R. 817 (1808).
90. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUsTRY, FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 60, at 20;
Re Goode, 24 F.L.R. 61 (1974) (loss through insolvency).
91. A securities firm can however make use of them as security for a loan to the
firmif the client is in debt to the firm. Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at §
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client's name unless the firm is requested to register the instru-
ments in its name.2 In line with this principle, securities laws
restrict the firms' power to use documents of the customer.
(8) Financial Resources
A firm should ensure that it maintains adequate financial re-
sources to meet its investment business commitments and to
withstand the risks to which its business is subject.
The capital adequacy requirement of Principle 8 is an at-
tempt to provide a safeguard of the financial resources of a firm
to help ensure the firm can meet its liabilities, especially its lia-
bilities to customers. Securities laws prescribe minimum capital
tests to reflect potential risks. 93 The Australian Corporations
Law requires stock exchange firms to lodge deposits with the
stock exchange equal to two-thirds of the lowest balance in their
trust accounts for the preceding quarter year. 4 The funds, held
by the exchange in trust for the firm, are invested in interest
bearing term deposits with an Australian bank or with an au-
thorized dealer in the short-term money market to ensure that
they are adequate to enable the firm to meet its business
commitments.
(9) Internal Organisation
A firm should organise and control its internal affairs in a re-
sponsible manner, keeping proper records, and where the firm
employs staff or is responsible for the conduct of investment
business by others, should have adequate arrangements to en-
sure that they are suitable, adequately trained and properly su-
pervised and that it has well-defined compliance procedures.
Principle 9 places responsibility on the securities firm to ac-
cept responsibility for the benefits of its authorization, and its
internal affairs are to be organized and controlled in a responsi-
ble manner. Records of accounts, transactions, and customer
lists, are to be kept, and securities laws mandate various disclo-
sures by means of accounts and registers.95 Australian law re-
873.
92. E.g., Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at § 873.
93. E.g., SEcuRrrIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD RULES ON FINANCIAL REGULATIONS; THE
SEcuRrrmEs ASSOCIATION, supra note 88.
94. Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at § 889. Trust accounts are re-
quired under Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at § 866.
95. See discussion of Principle 7 in text accompanying supra notes 88-92.
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quires registers of a firm's "relevant interest""8 (the, power to
control the voting rights attached to a security). Principle 9 also
confirms the common law rule that a firm, as controller, is vicar-
iously responsible for its staff. The firm is to have arrangements
in place to ensure the suitability, training, and supervision of its
staff to ensure the required compliance with the principles and
core rules. Breaches of the principles and the second-tier core
rules can therefore not be blamed on a staff member. The firm's
duties are not transferable.
(10) Relations with Regulators
A firm should 'deal with its regulator in an open and coopera-
tive manner and keep the regulator promptly informed of any-
thing concerning the firm which might reasonably be expected
to be disclosed to it.
Principle 10 specifies openness and cooperation in dealing
with regulators, and lays down the expectation that a firm will
keep the regulator promptly informed of anything relevant to
the regulator's task. This requirement is strengthened with the
full range of sanctions and penalties for its violation. This recog-
nizes that securities market regulation is a matter of co-regula-
tion, with a government created legislative framework and daily
administration in the hands of the SROs/RPBs subject to the
right of government to intervene.9 7 International securities laws
sometimes take this a step further, and provide that in the inter-
ests of securities regulation, the self-regulator itself is to cooper-
ate with the lead regulator in the performance of its task, in-
cluding providing the regulator with full and free access to its
facilities. 8 Principle 10 does not impose an affirmative duty on a
firm to seek guidance if it is in doubt on a particular area. In-
stead, the assumption is that the SROs can impose such a duty
under their own powers if desired.
IV. CONCLUSION
In any discussion of the principles of investment business in
any legal jurisdiction, the fiduciary duties owed by firm to client
are paramount. Plain English principles are a worthwhile prece-
96. Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, at Part 7.7.
97. SEcuRITms AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR INVESTMENT
Busiess, Principle 10, reprinted in 1990 REPORTER, supra note 35, at para. 96-230.
98. E.g., Australian Corporations Law, supra note 1, §§ 776 (securities exchange),
and 1139 (futures exchange).
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dent, but they must not lower existing fiduciary duties. The sug-
gestion that the British principles for investment business
should be enforceable by investors or others on public interest
grounds arguably expects more of the principles than they were
intended to achieve. However, breach of a principle is likely to
be a breach of the SIB or SRO/RPB rule book. These breaches
are actionable by the SRO/RPB in disciplinary proceedings and
also by a private investor under the Financial Services Act, and
to that extent the British principles achieve their purpose of re-
statement of the standards expected.

